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Abstract. In most computer science graduate programs, students must
complete an advanced research project that demonstrates the students
technical competence in both the theory and practice of the field. In-
formation security is a specialization area of computer science whose
research results have direct benefits to real world problems. The Com-
mon Criteria (CC) is an international standard for security evaluation
of products. This paper describes the utilization of the CC paradigmatic
framework for advanced student research projects focused on security
engineering. Three CC-based efforts of varying levels of difficulty are
presented and the suitability and benefits of applying the CC in this
context are discussed.
1 Introduction
Information security is a specialization area of computer science that is increas-
ingly attracting attention of academic, government, and industry-based com-
munities. This interest is driven by the exploitability of the Internet and the
heightened awareness of the lack of assurance in commodity computers. Al-
though work in computer security has been ongoing for several decades, it has
not been adopted along with other rapid advances in computer and network
technologies. This gap stems from the fact that the commercial sector is under
constant pressure to reduce time-to-market and compete with the latest techni-
cal gimmicks. Thus, the commercial sector has tended to ignore the principles
[1] and fundamentals of information security in product development. Accelerat-
ing government and commercial adoption of emerging technologies has created
significant financial and national security risks that must be addressed.
While the academic community has been more proactive in addressing the
need for better security education to prepare students for the real world work-
place [2], typical computer security coursework often tends to focus on static code
analysis, cryptography, secure protocols, and intrusion detection and analysis.
The security track of the Computer Science (CS) department at our institution
incorporates additional disciplines in information assurance and security with
an emphasis on high assurance secure systems and security engineering.
The Common Criteria (CC) is an internationally-recognized set of criterions
for Information Technology (IT) security evaluation [3]. It is the result of a multi-
national effort to harmonize different security evaluation criteria independently
developed by several North American and European governments [4–6]. As the
use of the CC in the commercial sector becomes more widespread, a natural pro-
gression would be to use it in education and research to both prepare students for
proficiency in secure system and software engineering techniques and to nurture
their appreciation of the value of rigorously-developed secure systems. CC hege-
mony remains an uncertain prospect, but the pedagogical value of applying the
CC to information security education and research is clear. Our premise is that
if the CC framework and methodology are used in both instructional courses
and student research projects, the students understanding of the fundamental
principles of information security will be more effectively strengthened and the
quality of student work will improve quantitatively. The central notion is that
this holistic approach enables the students to become better practitioners of the
fundamental knowledge gained during their academic endeavor.
This paper describes how the CC was utilized as a practical tool for secu-
rity requirements derivation in advanced student research projects. Background
information on CC coursework and information security research projects is pre-
sented, followed by the description of three thematic projects guided by the CC
framework. A discussion of the experience with the CC-based research approach
is included.
2 Background
Our nascent framework on CC education combines both traditional coursework
and faculty-supervised student theses that are part of multi-year research efforts.
2.1 Information Assurance Courses
The computer science (CS) coursework portfolio in our department consists of
a set of core computer science classes and a number of specialization courses.
The information assurance and security track augments the core CS classes with
principles and techniques of developing secure systems [7]. The CC concepts and
goals covered in some of the security track courses are described in Table 1.
2.2 Information Security Research Projects
Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) Project. The TCX project pro-
vides an openly disseminated worked example of how high robustness trusted
components can be constructed. The CC plays a crucial role, since the project
reference implementations, the TCX Separation Kernel and Trusted Path Ex-
tension application, are targeted for the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels 7 and
6 (EAL7 and EAL6), respectively [8, 9].
The security requirements (both functional and assurance) for the TCX ker-
nel will be based on the Separation Kernels Protection Profile (SKPP) [10].
Although the TCX team has considerable previous experience in high assur-
ance development, our participation in the authoring of the SKPP provides a
different perspective on the process to produce secure software and systems.
Specifically, we have found that with its iterative requirements derivation pro-
cess and structured requirements specification methodology, the CC can also be
used to effectively capture requirements for software and systems that are not
intended to undergo formal evaluation.
Table 1. CC Coverage in IA Courses





This class offers an introductory overview of the CC taxon-
omy, basic concepts in requirements specification and secu-
rity evaluation, Evaluation Assurance Levels, and evalua-





This class teaches secure system administration and man-
agement and discusses requirements covered in CS3600 in




This class addresses the principles and techniques of high
assurance secure system development. It includes a CC-
based laboratory project that introduces the students to
the CC methodology and assurance requirements. The stu-
dents learn how to apply in the CC framework in projects
such as requirements formulations and security extensions




This class discusses academic papers on advanced topics
in computer security, including the CC interpretation pro-
cess and the notion of high assurance composite evalua-
tion. The students gain exposure to how the CC standard
process is driven at the national level and the needs to






This class provides an introduction to the Certification
and Accreditation (C&A) process as applied to govern-
ment systems. The CC fundamentals covered in CS3600
are iterated in the context of C&A, with emphasis on hi-
erarchical Evaluation Assurance Level differences.
Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) Project. The MYSEA project
establishes an overarching framework that facilitates research and experimenta-
tion with ergonomic, i.e., user-centric, multilevel security (MLS). MYSEA is
a client-server distributed network environment that comprises a federation of
high assurance MLS servers and a number of local and remote networks of both
security-enhanced and unmodified commercial off-the-shelf clients [11, 12]. The
MYSEA server enforces the overall system security policy and its trusted operat-
ing base recently completed a CC EAL5 evaluation [13]. The security-enhanced
client system consists of a specialized security appliance (named Trusted Path
Extension) and commodity PCs executing popular commercial software. The
Trusted Path Extension provides user authentication and access control support
mechanisms, and the TCX Kernel will be used as its trusted operating base.
Although the provenance of MYSEA can be traced back to the TCSEC, re-
cent and current research activities are based on the CC framework. The CC
paradigm of defining secure systems in terms of the desired assurance level and
security capability, and against a well-defined threat analysis has been success-
fully adopted for use in a number of MYSEA-related student projects.
Multilevel Print Server (MPS) Project. The MPS project is part of a
network-centric information assurance solution that provides secure sharing of
network resources across different security domains. The goal of the MPS project
is the design and development of a trusted print server that can securely separate
print jobs originating from networks operating at different security levels. Since
the MLS print server is targeted for a CC evaluation at EAL4-plus, i.e., EAL4
with augmentation, the initial project goal is to develop a CC protection profile
(PP) sketch that defines the necessary set of security requirements at that level
for the MLS print server. The PP sketch was originally developed using Version
2.2 of the CC and is now being transitioned to Version 3.0 of the CC [14].
To achieve Version 3.0,the CC underwent a major overhaul and a significant
amount of effort is required to fully understand the ramifications of the changes.
The lack of requirements regarding hardware assurance, trusted initialization,
and the application of the principle of least privilege to both internal functions
and external subjects (e.g., programs) is a notable omission.
3 Theses as Case Studies in Common Criteria
Application
A number of advanced student research projects have emanated from the above
research efforts. Completing a thesis that demonstrates the students mastery in
both core and specialized subjects acquired through course work is a curriculum
requirement for all students. Three theses are described here to illustrate the
effectiveness of applying the CC framework to student research. The CC affords
students a systematic means to organize and conduct information security re-
search with different levels of difficulty. It also provides the thesis advisors with
quantitative metrics to assess the research result. Qualitative assessment of the
students ability to perform independent, graduate level research is subjective.
However, the students technical strength can be partially determined based on
the students ability to navigate and articulate the large selection of security
requirements defined by the CC.
In the sections that follow three theses are examined. These theses were
selected based on the extent of their CC utilization, the difficulty level of the re-
search project, and the students research ability. Table 2 summarizes the project
characteristics. In all cases, the students were expected to apply analytical rea-
soning skills and graduate level research techniques to their work.
Table 2. Project Characteristics






















3.1 TCX Dissemination System
Open dissemination of project material is one of the core objectives of the TCX
project. For TCX, open dissemination does not mean unrestricted dissemina-
tion. TCX materials have access control markings that are used as the basis for
distribution by the dissemination system [15].
The design of the TCX dissemination system is a worked example of the
application of the CC methodology to derive and express security requirements
for an informally specified system. The research activities for this effort can be
logically separated into three stages: system requirements elicitation, security
requirements derivation, and proof-of-concept prototype implementation. The
CC plays an important role in the second stage.
Based on the threat properties of the TCX dissemination system, e.g., a web
interface that is to be available online to the general public, a threat analysis
of the trusted delivery mechanisms required for the TCX kernel was completed
first. The result of this analysis helped narrow down the list of high level sys-
tem requirements for the dissemination system. In contrast with the next stage
where the use of the CC is prominent, the requirements elicitation process was
conducted informally.
In the second stage, a CC-based requirements derivation process was used to
translate, through structured analysis, the high level system requirements into
a set of informal security requirements for both the dissemination system and
its environment. The CC requirements expression rules were loosely followed to
help organize and represent these security requirements. A number of improperly
specified objectives and requirements were discovered and redefined as the result
of iteratively applying the CC traceability methodology. The last stage involved
the construction of an initial implementation that satisfies a subset of the system
requirements.
In the U.S. evaluation scheme, the robustness level of a system is determined
by the value of the resources that the system needs to protect and the autho-
rization of external entities that can access the resources [16]. A basic level of
robustness was selected for the dissemination system because the project mate-
rials that can be disseminated online are low-value data, reducing the likelihood
of attacks by external entities (i.e., Internet users). High-value project materials
are handled separately, on a case-by-case basis.
Although the CC requirements derivation process was used, the difficulty
level of this thesis is rated low because the requirements need not be stated
with CC constructs. Furthermore, the design of the dissemination system was
from a clean slate, with no backward compatibility burdens. However, due to
the students steep learning curve on both the CC and the web technology re-
quired to implement the initial prototype, the thesis took longer than expected
to complete.
3.2 MYSEA Single Sign-On Framework
To address scalability, the MYSEA design allows the use of more than one MY-
SEA server in a local operating environment. Support for such a federation of
servers is not available in the current MYSEA implementation. To avoid requir-
ing the user to separately authenticate to different servers, a secure single sign-on
user authentication mechanism is needed. Hence, the primary objective of this
student research project is to define an architectural framework and high level
design for a single sign-on (SSO) solution for MYSEA [17].
Central to the SSO design is the MYSEA Authentication Server. One of
the MYSEA servers in the federation will assume this role and be responsible
for user authentication and session negotiation. The other SSO component is
the MYSEA Application Management Server. This component provides appli-
cation services to authenticated users and can colocate with the authentication
server on the same platform. Although the SSO design allows the Authentication
Server functionality to be distributed among multiple servers, the thesis focused
primarily on the single Authentication Server configuration. The security, us-
ability, and to a lesser extent, performance and reliability requirements of the
Authentication Server were within the scope of this thesis.
Similar to the TCX dissemination system project, the decision to use the CC
as a guiding tool for security analysis was made early in the thesis process. The
CC methodology for defining security requirements based on threats, security
assumptions, organizational security policies, and security objectives in the con-
text of a protection profile was applied to develop security requirements for the
Authentication Server component. Security analysis of the Application Manage-
ment Server component and the distributed Authentication Server configuration
were identified as future work.
Ideally the robustness level of the Authentication Server should be high since
the MYSEA network is an MLS environment. However, medium robustness was
chosen for this thesis for three reasons: 1) guidance for high robustness PP devel-
opment is currently not available, 2) other than the emerging SKPP there were
no existing high assurance protection profiles that the student could examine for
reference, and 3) the work had to be at an attainable level so that the student
could complete within the time allotted for thesis work.
The difficulty level of this thesis was expected to be medium because the SSO
design was required to fit into the existing MYSEA architecture. Furthermore,
security analysis of a distributed architecture is complex, especially when the use
of structured security evaluation criteria is imposed on the analysis. The learning
curve on the CC methodology was not as steep as in the case of the TCX
dissemination system thesis (discussed earlier) since the dissemination system
thesis was available for use as example. Not using the CC constructs and wording
to express the security requirements also simplified the work.
3.3 MLS Print Server Protection Profile Sketch
A multilevel print server (MPS) enforces a mandatory access control policy re-
garding input received from multiple networks at different sensitivity levels, and
provides trusted separation pages indicating the sensitivity level of print jobs
sent to either a dedicated or networked system high printer. The MPS also en-
forces supporting policies to include: detection of malicious print jobs, audit
generation, audit logging and alarms, a trusted path for administrators, secu-
rity and audit administrator tools, and operator services. The thesis goal was
to develop a necessary set of security requirements, in the context of an EAL4
(with augmentation) protection profile sketch, for an MPS supporting Hewlett
Packard Print Command Language (PCL) [18].
In the case of this thesis, the difference between a PP sketch and a complete
PP was the omission of the rationale sections. In the CC paradigm, a PP must
provide rationale that explains how the security requirements satisfy the stated
security objectives, and how the objectives mitigate the threats and implement
the organizational policies. Writing a comprehensive rationale is difficult and it
was determined a priori that it would be an unachievable goal for the student.
Multiple factors distinguished this student project from the last two. It was
our first experiment involving students in structured CC work in the form of
a protection profile sketch. The PP sketch was developed to address a real-
world security need and had to satisfy specific system requirements established
by the intended users. Last, the PP sketch required structured expression of
security requirements that conform to the Consistency Instruction Manual for
PP development [19]. The thesis difficulty level was high due to these factors.
This thesis is highly technical because it requires a good understanding of the
CC, multilevel security, component composition, and PCL printer technology.
These prerequisites together with the students steep learning curve necessitated
extensive faculty involvement in order to complete the project on time.
4 Discussion
For the theses examined, the CC security analysis methodology was an effective
tool for analyzing and deriving security requirements. However, the suitability
of the CC for non-instructional education does not stop there. When used as an
organizational framework in student research projects, the CC provides a struc-
ture for keeping the project goal in focus and making decisions, both technical
and logistic. It also affords the thesis advisors a means to encourage students
to employ self-governance of their work. Each student met weekly with the fac-
ulty advisors. A weekly goal emerged from each meeting. For example, students
might be required to produce a certain section of their requirements document
in the CC format, e.g., threats, assumptions, etc., prior to the next meeting at
which a review of the work would be conducted. These reviews provided the
student with feedback which either resulted in another iteration of the section
or transition to a new section or phase of the effort.
4.1 Student Readiness
It became apparent that the CC-based approach was challenging and expensive
for the faculty advisors since the CC learning curve was steep for the students.
The CC coverage in the six core and specialized courses described earlier was not
enough to prepare the students for CC-based research work. It has also become
evident that classroom instruction on the CC must be reinforced by hands-on
experience in order for the information learned from these classes to sink in.
4.2 Commonalities of Theses
The CC defines a system that undergoes evaluation as a Target of Evaluation
(TOE) and a set of hardware and software mechanisms of the TOE that enforces
the security policy as the TOE Security Functions (TSF) [3]. Although each
thesis addressed a different TOE, all required the students to go beyond what
they had learned of the CC in their classes.
First, each student had to define the system sufficiently to allow the identi-
fication of the TOE and its boundary. The use of the CC paradigm affords the
student a systematic way to identify security critical functionality, resulting in a
more precise system definition. As it was, each student had to identify elements
of the system that were beyond the control of the TOE. They then had to deter-
mine the boundary of the TSF. As each system was in its conceptual stage, this
process tended to be difficult and required considerable design discussion with
the faculty advisors. What added to the challenge was the initial lack of intuition
on the part of the students regarding the distinctions among TOE, TSF, and
the external components with which the TOE would interoperate.
Creation of the requirements creation was iterative and, for the students,
this generally presented a challenge. Some were used to a very linear approach
to problem solving that did not require adjustments. The thought of revisiting
a stage that had already been addressed (often with the belief that the previous
work at that stage was complete) seemed to be viewed as failure rather than
an opportunity for improvement. Thus, the students needed to develop a new
perspective to problem solving.
The CC-based process used by the students to derive security requirements
is depicted in Figure 1. The process consisted of three iterative phases. In Phase
I, the system description was prepared, starting with the general description of
the thesis topic and followed by a series of refinements. The resulting system
description covered different aspects of the target system, including its concept
of operation, conceptual architecture and system access policy. Phase II involved
the establishment of the security objectives. This was started with the definition
of the systems security environment stated in terms of anticipated threats, en-
vironmental assumptions, and organizational security policies. The appropriate
PP authoring manual [16, 19] was consulted to create the initial set of threats,
assumptions, and organizational policies, which were then solidified through an
iterative pruning and feedback process. A careful analysis of the security environ-
ment resulted in a set of security objectives that satisfied the intended functional
goals and purpose of the target system. The articulation of the security require-
ments took place in Phase III. Depending on the nature of the thesis, the security
requirements were specified either informally using an ad hoc format or formally
using CC constructs and wording. The development of the requirements was also
iterative and often caused subsequent reassessments of the security objectives.
The CC paradigm for requirements derivation is iterative by nature and
requires the results of a given activity be traceable to the derived elements of
the previous activity. The traceability is demonstrated by the evidential mate-
rial defined as rationale description. In two theses, the rationale that mapped
the threats, assumptions, and organizational policies to security objectives was
produced. Each threat and organizational policy was mapped to an objective
that addressed it and a rationale was provided for why that objective miti-
gated the threat. Assumptions were mapped to environmental objectives, with
a corresponding rationale describing how the environmental objective met the
assumption. Each security objective should have been mapped to one or more
security requirements but this last set of mappings was not conducted.
There were several reasons for omitting the rational in the objectives-to-
requirements mapping. Primary among them was the fact that the students
simply ran out of time due to the steep learning curve they had experienced
with the Common Criteria. In addition, we felt that their level of experience
working with the Common Criteria was insufficient for that task. Thus, had we



















Fig. 1. Feedback cycles in requirements process
cal exercise for them and would not have contained the subtle observations that
make the objectives-to-requirements rationale useful.
4.3 Faculty Experience
The advisors involved in the case study theses are well trained in both security
engineering and security evaluation criteria. Our work on the SKPP provided
valuable insights into how the CC works, which triggered the realization that
the CC could be adapted for use in areas that traditionally do not require a
structured framework. Since the CC is constantly being improved at both in-
ternational and national levels, we have been concentrating mostly on the in-
terpretations and guidance pertinent to the U.S. scheme. Our approach to keep
abreast with the ever-changing CC is to actively participate the development of
various protection profiles. Since the TCX kernel and reference applications are
targeted for EAL 7 and EAL 6, we are further motivated to continue to stay on
top of the latest CC developments.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that the use of the Common Criteria as
a research framework for graduate students is beneficial as it imposes disciplines
required for secure systems and software development on the research work. For
thesis advisors, these disciplines help establish a trackable process to monitor
student performance and progress.
To better prepare the students for CC-based research, we are currently de-
veloping a full-quarter course on the application of the Common Criteria for
security analysis and engineering of secure systems and software. In addition
to its primary objective, we intend for this course to provide an in-depth un-
derstanding of how security evaluation criteria can be adapted for use in non-
evaluation activities, including academic research. Included in the course work is
the examination of existing Protection Profiles and Security Targets which gives
students both insight on domain-specific requirements expression and familiar-
ity with the complicated CC-prescribed constructs and rules. It is anticipated
that this hands-on approach will smooth out the students learning curve prior to
thesis work, making it less demanding for both the student and thesis advisors.
We are continuing our experiment in this area with an in-progress thesis on
the development of a high robustness PP sketch for a trusted platform. Since
guidance for authors of high robustness protection profiles does not exist and
the security issues associated with a high assurance platform that the PP sketch
must address are highly complex, it remains to be seen if our approach will be
as effective as in the past.
Related future work is to determine if requirements derivation would be easier
if one could assume that it is possible to determine when a class of failures could
be detected.
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